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PREFACE
The G-24 Discussion Paper Series is a collection of research papers prepared
under the UNCTAD Project of Technical Support to the Intergovernmental Group of
Twenty-Four on International Monetary Affairs and Development (G-24). The G-24
was established in 1971 with a view to increasing the analytical capacity and the
negotiating strength of the developing countries in discussions and negotiations in the
international financial institutions. The G-24 is the only formal developing-country
grouping within the IMF and the World Bank. Its meetings are open to all developing
countries.
The G-24 Project, which is administered by UNCTAD’s Division on Globalization
and Development Strategies, aims at enhancing the understanding of policy makers in
developing countries of the complex issues in the international monetary and financial
system, and at raising awareness outside developing countries of the need to introduce
a development dimension into the discussion of international financial and institutional
reform.
The research papers are discussed among experts and policy makers at the meetings
of the G-24 Technical Group, and provide inputs to the meetings of the G-24 Ministers
and Deputies in their preparations for negotiations and discussions in the framework of
the IMF’s International Monetary and Financial Committee (formerly Interim Committee)
and the Joint IMF/IBRD Development Committee, as well as in other forums.
The Project of Technical Support to the G-24 receives generous financial support
from the International Development Research Centre of Canada and contributions from
the countries participating in the meetings of the G-24.IMF CONTINGENCY FINANCING FOR MIDDLE-INCOME
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Abstract
In order to assess the proposal of the IMF to create a Reserve Augmentation Line
(RAL), this paper first reviews the conditions that led to the loss of IMF control over
balance of payments financing, and how private capital flows increased the liquidity
requirements for system stability. It then reviews how the IMF responded to these
problems, before assessing whether the RAL represents a sufficient improvement to
the Contingent Credit Line (CCL), the unused predecessor to the RAL, in providing
signals that will reduce the probability of crisis for countries implementing it, as well
as conditions to convince countries to actually use it.
The main argument of the paper is that, despite the fact that the RAL constitutes some
improvements over the CCL, it also still exhibits limitations in providing the kind of
rapid support that member states might expect, thereby limiting the possible success
of the RAL in acting as a “seal of approval”, as well as convincing countries to
actually use it. Apart from the limited extent of improvement of the drawbacks of the
CCL, there are still several unresolved issues regarding the RAL, as with any draft
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In the 1970s, a major shift took place in the
international financial system that changed the role
of the International Monetary Fund in providing li-
quidity to countries seeking to satisfy their commitment
to their Article IV exchange rate peg to gold or the
dollar. As a result of the sharp increase in the share
of private financial flows in international balance of
payments financing, the IMF lost its dominant role
in overseeing the provision of liquidity to countries
in external disequilibrium. It also lost its dominant
role in overseeing the adjustment process and in lim-
iting the size of external disequilibria. The increased
role of private financing created the possibility of
much larger cumulative imbalances that led to large
accumulations of sovereign debt stocks and created
the conditions in which capital flow reversals could
produce internal and external default. The sums re-
quired to insure exchange rate stability in the pres-
ence of such reversals far exceeded the Fund’s
normal provisions for balance of payments lending,
even after a number of increases in official quotas
and special agreements to borrow short-term from
creditor countries.
In response to these changes the Fund experi-
mented with a new approach that used approval of a
financing arrangement as a signalling device to gen-
erate a catalytic response in the private sector
designed to stem a capital reversal and restore ac-
cess to international capital markets. While evidence
of success of this new approach to produce the an-
ticipated catalytic effect in economies experiencing
external disequilibrium due to capital flow reversal
is meagre, the Fund has recently suggested that there
is some evidence that Fund precautionary arrange-
ments could reduce the probability of a future capital
reversal. This would occur when there is a credible
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commitment by the Fund to make exceptional ac-
cess available in the event of crisis, accompanied by
a credible commitment from the government to main-
tain appropriate economic policies, monitored on a
regular basis for compliance by Fund staff. The Fund
has thus attempted to adapt the new approach to cre-
ate credible precautionary “pre-crisis” programmes
that contain a sufficient pre-commitment of Fund
financing, accompanied by members’ commitments
to maintain sound policies that private capital markets
would interpret as a credible defence against a crisis
of confidence caused by contagion due to an exter-
nal shock. It was to serve these purposes that the Fund
created the Contingent Credit Line (CCL), and after
it lapsed, the Reserve Augmentation Line (RAL1).
This paper reviews the conditions that led to
the loss of Fund control over balance of payments
financing, and the how the role of private capital
flows increased the liquidity requirements for sys-
tem stability. It then reviews how the Fund responded
to these problems, before assessing whether the RAL
represents a sufficient improvement of the CCL to
provide the appropriate signals that will reduce the
probability of crisis for countries implementing it,
as well as sufficiently attractive conditions to con-
vince countries to use it.
Flexible exchange rates and the private
financing of payments imbalances
The eventual acceptance of flexible exchange
rates after the United States decision to abandon the
dollar peg to gold in 1971 produced a radical change
in the mandate of the International Monetary Fund.
However, despite a detailed set of recommendations
from the Group of Twenty, the only fundamental
change was the amendment in January 1976 of Arti-
cle IV of the Articles of Agreement dealing with
exchange arrangements to allow members complete
freedom of choice.2
The proponents of flexible exchange rates had
argued that flexibility would facilitate smoother,
market-based adjustment of external imbalances and
negate the need for countries to hold large foreign
exchange reserves to support currency parity. The
reduced importance of reserves in providing systemic
stability thus implied a reduced need for countries
to borrow from the IMF to bolster their reserves.
It also implied that the newly created source of
international liquidity, the SDR, would be largely
redundant. 
However, as was pointed out by Robert Triffin,
the system based on flexible exchange rates produced
just the opposite response. “It has led to an inflation
of world monetary reserves unprecedented in his-
tory. ... Measured in dollars, they have increased
eleven times as much in eleven years (1970-80) as
in all previous years and centuries since Adam and
Eve.” Triffin concluded that the new “world mon-
etary ‘system’ – or rather non-system – obviously
functions today in a way totally opposite to the ob-
jectives it should serve.”3
The introduction of flexible exchange rates was
also accompanied by a rapid increase in the private
financing of international payments imbalances, ini-
tially through the Euro dollar market, and then in
response to the structural payments imbalances that
followed the increase in petroleum prices.4 However,
as noted in the McCracken Report,5 “The shift to
increased reliance on private lenders for official fi-
nancing purposes marked ... [a] transformation [that]
had already been going on for some time. ... The
events of 1974-76 simply confirmed and accelerated
a trend in the process of liquidity creation that had been
evident well before the oil price increases of 1973.”
The IMF responded to this increased demand
for international liquidity with quota increases of
over one-third in 1976 and over 50 per cent in 1978.
In addition to a temporary Oil Facility in 1974 (re-
newed in 1975), an Extended Facility was also
introduced in 1974 to provide for longer-term ex-
ceptional access (up to 140 per cent of quota) relief
for structural adjustment problems. In 1979, a Sup-
plementary Financing Facility provided additional
access for countries experiencing persistent pay-
ments deficits substantially in excess of their quotas.6
The result was the creation of the possibility for
members to access exceptional financing7 of over
400 per cent of quota.8 However, these new facili-
ties proved to be inadequate to the liquidity needs of
the system as shown by the sharp acceleration in the
rising trend of private financing of balance of pay-
ments disequilibria that occurred in this period.
Guido Carli, Governor of the Bank of Italy,
drew the following conclusions: “... there is at
present no international monetary system, that is,
there is no official institution capable of supplying3 IMF Contingency Financing for Middle-income Countries with Access to Private Capital Markets
the international payments system with the liquidity
required for the further expansion of trade. This func-
tion has been taken over by the private banking
system, and primarily by the U.S. banks, through
operations carried out by their branches at home and
abroad. The private banks have shown a greater abil-
ity than the official institutions not only to create
the necessary liquidity for the development of trade
but also to organize its efficient distribution. As a
result, the IMF’s ability to enforce observance of
rules of conduct has diminished; it should be remem-
bered that, as originally conceived, the Fund’s
prescriptive powers derived from its ability to ex-
clude refractory countries from access to conditional
credit. As almost all credit is now drawn from other
than official sources, the Fund’s ability to lay down
conditions has been correspondingly reduced. And
as the function of creating international liquidity has
been transferred from official institutions to private
ones, so the task of supervision has passed from inter-
national bodies to national ones, whose surveillance,
though keener than in the past, has nonetheless never
reached beyond the boundaries of national interests.”9
The result of this sharp increase in private mar-
ket intermediation was a lapse in risk assessment on
private loans and deficient national supervision that
emerged in a liquidity crisis in the very year that
Carli spoke, and as a full scale regional financial
crisis in 1982.
After the long adjustment period in the 1980s,
private capital flows again resumed their rapid pace
of increase in the 1990s, and the result was another
sharp increase in demand for Fund resources. But in
difference from the 1970s, it was the capital flows
themselves that created the external disequilibria,
rather than a disruption in international commodity
prices or in trade flows, so countries could not use
private markets to satisfy their increased demand for
liquidity. The IMF thus stood alone as provider of
liquidity to meet the 1994-5 Tequila crisis, the 1997-8
Asian crisis, and the 1998 Russian default that led
to the global liquidity crisis. But in similarity with
the 1970s, IMF resources were still insufficient to
meet the liquidity needs of the system, and it was
necessary to involve governments and other multi-
lateral and regional financial institutions in providing
liquidity to the system.
As a result of this increased demand, in 1998,
a record SDR 32 billion of new arrangements were
approved, producing a total Fund credit outstanding
of over SDR 67 billion in 1999, extending into the
early years of the present decade when the absolute
record high for Fund credit outstanding would reach
nearly SDR 73 billion in 2003. As in the 1970s, many
countries were granted exceptional access to Fund
resources.
Thus, while in theory, the shift to flexible rates
should have reduced global liquidity requirements,
paradoxically, the increase in private global liquid-
ity due to the increase in private financing created a
substantial increase in the demand for official liquid-
ity to ensure exchange rate stability under the revised
Article IV. It also produced a sharp increase in the
magnitude of the resources the IMF would have to
supply to members to support their commitments
under Article IV. The next section explains how the
increasing dominance of private balance of payments
financing produced the increase in demand for li-
quidity provision by the Fund.
Private financing and increased
demands for official liquidity
The post-war international financial and trad-
ing system created at Bretton Woods was buttressed
on the presumption that there would be minimal pri-
vate capital flows and that the majority of international
financing would be intermediated by the newly cre-
ated multilateral financial institutions, subject to
government oversight and control. IMF lending was
to be directed to the support of a member’s Article
IV commitment to meet their declared exchange rate
parity with gold or the United States dollar. Coun-
tries could draw against their quota10 to meet external
claims on domestic residents at this par rate (or at a
newly agreed par rate) if they had insufficient for-
eign exchange reserves to do so, while domestic
economic policies were adjusted to restore external
balance “without resorting to measures destructive
of national or international prosperity”. It was pre-
sumed that this adjustment would take place within
a relatively short period of time and that the result-
ing external surplus would repay Fund lending and
restore the borrowing country’s reserves to their
normal levels.11
The primary causes of external disequilibrium
were considered to be excess domestic absorption due
to a fiscal imbalance created by excess government4 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 47
spending, or exchange rate overvaluation due to
excess demand producing inflation above that of
trading partners. Thus, the policies required to re-
store external equilibrium should reduce absorption
by creating a government budget surplus and being
supported by monetary restriction. If excess demand
also produced an inflation differential that could not
be reversed by policy measures, an exchange rate
adjustment might be sought to change relative prices
of traded and non-traded goods to restore interna-
tional competitiveness.
In theory, the size of a country’s cumulative
external imbalance before it drew against its Fund
quota was thus limited by the member’s foreign ex-
change reserves. Since most countries kept foreign
reserves, as a rule of thumb, at some multiple – usu-
ally three or four months – of imports, the size of
the cumulative imbalance that could be built up be-
fore corrective action was taken was limited.
Fund lending that was provided to members
while they implemented policies to restore external
equilibrium was thus similar to what in private fi-
nance are called “bridging loans”, providing the
borrower with short-term funding to maintain a po-
sition in an asset until permanent financing can be
arranged. In the case of IMF balance of payments
adjustment lending, the funds were to allow the bor-
rower to maintain external commitments at the
official, or the new (devalued), parity for the period
of time required to bring the external account back
into surplus by implementing adjustment policies.
The foreign exchange generated from the return to
external surpluses thus represented the “permanent”
financing that allowed reserves to be restored to
normal levels and the bridge loan to be repaid to the
IMF.12 The adjustment period for the outstanding
bridge loan was expected to be relatively short,13 the
support required relatively modest, and the interest
rates charged concessional, with the IMF the sole
major creditor. Under such arrangements, deficit
countries could not build up large debt stocks on a
permanent basis. Since quotas were broadly linked
to a country’s trading position and income, they were
sufficient to provide the necessary bridge finance so
that countries would usually not require large or sus-
tained access to Fund resources.
However, as noted above, the breakdown of the
Bretton Woods system brought with it a fundamen-
tal change in which official balance of payments
financing was increasingly substituted by private
bank loans and portfolio flows. As Governor Carli
emphasized, this shift sharply reduced the ability of
the IMF to use its monopoly on financing to enforce
policy conditionality to restore equilibrium; private
loans were usually made with minimal conditionality.
More important, however, was that private fi-
nancing made it possible for countries to undergo
external disequilibrium for much longer periods, and
as a result, to accumulate large stocks of private and
sovereign external indebtedness, usually denomi-
nated in foreign currencies. In difference from the
original Bretton Woods system, in which cumula-
tive deficits were limited by exchange reserves and
Fund resources, under the emerging system of pri-
vate financing, the size of the cumulative imbalance
was only limited by the ability of the borrower to
continue to access private sector lending.
Rather than “bridge” lending, this private sector
financing of individual country balance of payments
deficits was similar to what is called “Ponzi” finance,
where additional borrowing is required in order to
finance debt service on previous lending. Just as in
any Ponzi financing scheme, continued lending de-
pends on the creditors’ belief in the ultimate ability
of debtors to repay. And since the ability to repay
depends on the ability of the debtor to continue to
borrow, these beliefs can be self-reinforcing, but also
highly volatile and rapidly reversed. Even a failure
to roll over existing facilities could lead not only to
exchange rate instability, in many cases, it could lead
to currency inconvertibility imposing default on for-
eign loans and insolvency in domestic financial and
non-financial institutions which had incurred foreign
indebtedness.14
In the case of private sector funding of pay-
ments deficits, the line between the extreme need
for liquidity and insolvency becomes blurred. In prin-
ciple, any Ponzi borrower is insolvent. However, as
Walter Wriston noted with respect to private bank
lending to Latin America in the 1970s, sovereign
borrowers cannot go bankrupt.15 This is technically
true, but it depends on whether a country can imple-
ment policies that will bring its external accounts
back into equilibrium and generate the resources
necessary to meet debt service “without resorting to
measures destructive of national or international
prosperity”. This means that the redirection of re-
sources must take place without becoming politically
unsustainable, in which case there will there be a
default, irrespective of whether the country is tech-5 IMF Contingency Financing for Middle-income Countries with Access to Private Capital Markets
nically insolvent or not. Insolvency and default then
cease to be a purely economic matter.16
Under the new system, larger accumulated defi-
cits meant larger liquidity support required to allow
countries to avoid default and initiate adjustment.
The amount of support to ensure exchange rate sta-
bility in the face of such a reversal in confidence by
lenders would require, at a minimum, the value of
creditors’ outstanding short-term foreign claims, plus
funds sufficient to see off any foreign speculators
and domestic capital flight.17 That is, sums several
orders of magnitude greater than were required un-
der fixed exchange rates with official financing.
Further, the need for liquidity could come much more
rapidly and with much less warning than under a
system in which declining foreign reserves repre-
sented a certain signal of impending need for Fund
support for the exchange rate.
Despite the quota increases approved in the
1970s, the Fund had not increased its liquidity suffi-
ciently to meet the vastly increased magnitude of
the imbalances that would emerge from a system
based on private financing and the associated accu-
mulation of external debt. As a result, the Fund thus
lost its ability to impose policies on countries facing
external imbalance because it was no longer the
monopoly supplier of adjustment financing. Unable
to increase resources and unwilling to allow meas-
ures that would stem the flow of private financing,
the Fund sought to leverage its resources by chang-
ing its approach to “catalytic” liquidity provision in
order to restore its ability to control financing and
impose policy conditionality for members facing
external instability.
This new approach is described by Managing
Director Rodrigo de Rato: “The shift to a system in
which member countries choose their own exchange
rate regimes brought a new mandate for the Fund to
exercise firm surveillance over members’ exchange
rate policies, and their macroeconomic policies more
broadly, in order to ensure the effective operation of
the international monetary system.”18 As described
by a former IMF Deputy Director, this “firm surveil-
lance” of countries with Fund stand-by arrangements
represents a “seal of approval” that “reassures in-
vestors and donors that a country’s economic policies
are on the right track, and helps to generate addi-
tional financing from these sources. This means, of
course, that the Fund has to be careful to maintain
its credibility: if we lose that credibility, by lending
in support of inadequate policies, such catalytic,
complementary support would not be forthcom-
ing.”19 This new role of the surveillance of policy
conditionality of IMF lending acting as a catalyst
for additional private sector financing, rather than
as the sole provider of liquidity for its members, is
confirmed by the IMF Independent Evaluation Of-
fice noting that, in practice, “creditors ... tended to
link increasing parts of their financing flows to the
existence of an IMF lending arrangement acting as
a ‘seal of approval’ on recipient country policies.”20
In this new approach, Fund assumed the role
of guarantor to private lenders that the adjustment
policies recommended to and adopted by the bor-
rowing country would restore equilibrium and ensure
full repayment of interest and principal on outstand-
ing private claims. There would then be no reason
for capital flight and private lenders should be con-
vinced to roll over existing commitments. A Fund
arrangement thus has to provide a signalling func-
tion21 to private market participants that acts as a
catalyst that generates additional lending to the coun-
try to supplement the IMF lending. The new approach
did not, however, deal with the source of the diffi-
culty in the sustained private market financing of
payments imbalances – only with its ability to deal
with the resulting instability.22
Thus, it is the credibility of the Fund’s policy
advice in the view of private sector lenders, more
than the signalling provided by the commitment of
sufficient liquidity, that is now critical in generating
the overall levels of liquidity support required for
the Fund’s role in providing stability to the interna-
tional financial system. This is not to say that Fund
lending is not important – the size of the Fund’s own
commitment in a policy arrangement will produce a
strong demonstration effect to private lenders. And
this signalling effect is reinforced by the willing-
ness of the Fund to commit itself to the country by
granting exceptional access.23
Thus, the basic components of the Fund ap-
proach to a credible catalytic arrangement include
support that exceeds traditional limits, i.e., excep-
tional access, and policy commitments from the
borrower. Success would ensure the necessary pri-
vate capital inflows to allow repayment to the Fund
within a relatively short period of time, and to meet
debt service to private lenders on a timely basis.6 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 47
Special liquidity facilities for developing
countries with private financing
As noted above, the least developed country
members of the IMF are dealt with through a sepa-
rate process, while developed countries have not
been borrowers from the Fund for some decades.
The new approach is thus designed to deal with
problems facing those, primarily middle-income,
developing countries that have been able to access
private international borrowing to finance their ex-
ternal positions or have been recipients of substantial
foreign inflows in excess of their financing needs.
As in the 1970s, the Fund responded to the increased
needs for liquidity after the series of capital account
balance of payments crises in the 1990s with the crea-
tion of new facilities that were meant to incorporate
those factors noted above as being necessary to gen-
erate a catalytic response from private sector lenders.
Short-term Financing Facility (STFF)
A proposal was made on the eve of the Mexi-
can crisis to create a new facility for emerging market
and industrialised countries with extensive integra-
tion in international capital markets. The “short-term
financing facility” (STFF) proposal incorporated an
automatic right to draw (analogous to the original
gold tranche) and a drawing subject to Executive
Board review and approval. The two-tier approach
was designed to strike a balance between automa-
ticity and protection of Fund resources against moral
hazard. The request for conditional support was to
be made during Article IV consultations, and con-
sidered separately from any support required for current
account imbalances. The Fund approval of access was
designed to signal international financial markets a seal
of approval of the country’s underlying external pay-
ments position. The proposed Fund support was to be
commensurate with the size of reserve losses that coun-
tries could sustain with generating loss of confidence,
but with a proposed upper limit of 300 per cent of quota,
the facility was clearly not designed to provide full
financing for the impact for reserve losses due to
external shocks. The Facility was never approved.
Supplemental Reserve Facility (SRF)
Created in December 1997 as part of the ex-
ceptional Fund assistance for the Republic of Korea,
the SRF was intended to meet the needs of countries
with exceptional balance of payments problems
owing to large short-term financing needs caused
by a sudden reversal of capital flows due to loss of
market confidence. It provides exceptional access
under a Stand-By or Extended Arrangement for up
to one year, available in two or more drawings.
Approval was based on the expectation that the
financing will allow borrowers to commit to and con-
sistently implement adjustment policies that will
result in early correction of the balance of payments
difficulties – the seal of approval. Repayment is
expected in 1 to 1½ years of the date of each draw-
ing, with possible extension by one year, after which
time repayment is obligatory. The SRF is clearly de-
signed to generate a catalytic impact and IMF
assessment of the request for a SRF takes into ac-
count the financing provided by other creditors.
During the first year from the date of approval
of financing to a country under the SRF, the use of
IMF resources is subject to a surcharge of 300 basis
points above the rate of charge on IMF loans. This
rate is increased by 50 basis points at the end of that
period and every six months thereafter until the sur-
charge reaches 500 basis points.
However, the experience of catalytic lending
by the Fund produced little evidence that it made a
major impact in preventing or lessening the severity
of crisis by convincing private lenders to change their
risk-averse flight behaviour in conditions of crisis.
However, the Fund did believe that there was evi-
dence that its precautionary lending arrangements
had been instrumental in preventing crisis, and it thus
fine-tuned the new approach by creating new pre-
cautionary facilities.
Contingent Credit Line (CCL)
The global liquidity crisis that followed the
Russian default confirmed the existence of conta-
gion in globally integrated financial markets. In
response, the Fund created the Contingent Credit
Line in 1999. It was designed to provide countries
who requested it with a positive signalling device
concerning their performance during any external
financial difficulties in order to pre-empt any sub-
stantial capital flow reversal due to a liquidity crisis
caused by contagion from an external shock. It was,
in a sense, an attempt to provide insurance against
the loss of the benefits of good policies resulting7 IMF Contingency Financing for Middle-income Countries with Access to Private Capital Markets
from failures in other countries. Similar to the SRF,
it provided for a pre-commitment to exceptional
access. In addition, it required a history of good per-
formance in pursuing policies that were considered
unlikely to produce a need for balance of payments
financing as evidence of the pre-commitment to
maintain credible policies. It provided the IMF seal
of approval for countries without the need for a cur-
rent IMF Stand-by arrangement.
However, many countries considered that the
signal might be more negative than positive and in-
dicate a country’s expectation of an impending
difficulty that had not been detected by market par-
ticipants. An additional drawback was the phasing
of the overall commitment. Making the disbursement
of funds subject to an initial reexamination and a
phased review implicitly creates doubt about the
commitment of a country to maintain its policy
stance and signals the possible withdrawal of the seal
of approval. This reduced the credibility of both the
Fund’s commitment of resources and its own belief
in the durability of a country’s commitment. Inter-
ruption of the Facility would send a clear negative
signal and generate the outflows that the Facility was
designed to stop. This drawback remained after the
2000 review led to more rapid disbursement of the
initial phase of the financing.
The repayment period of one year to eighteen
months was also designed to enhance credibility –
any imbalance that lasted longer than that period of
time would, in all probability, represent a more per-
manent, structural difficulty, rather than the result
of contagion from external events. Implicitly failure
to repay within this short timeframe would require
rolling over the CCL into a traditional Stand-by or
Extended Fund arrangement through the SRF.
This raises an even more important drawback
as a country meeting the conditions applicable to
CCL relief would always be able to access SRF fund-
ing in the case of need and the initial charges on the
two facilities were the same. Since the commitment
fee was only waived on condition of taking up fund-
ing, this made the CCL more costly for the strongest
countries and indifferent for weaker countries. This
drawback was not fully eliminated by the reduction
in charges and revision of commitment fees in the
2000 revision. The failure of any country to take up
the Facility in what was a reasonably stable period
from 2000 to 2003 raised the question of whether a
separate Facility is necessary.
Reserve Augmentation Line (RAL)
In spite of the fact that it was never used, the
Fund has indicated that it has received requests from
members to provide a replacement for the CCL, and
has recently proposed a Reserve Augmentation Line
(RAL).24 Like the CCL, it is designed to act as a
“seal of approval” signalling device to shield quali-
fying countries from contagion capital account crises
originating in other countries.
Expanded qualification
While it is also designed for middle-income
developing countries integrated into the international
private financial and trading system, qualifications
would be amended to include countries whose per-
formance is sufficient not to require Fund support,
but nonetheless exhibit “some vulnerability, prima-
rily with respect to their external debt position and
private sector balance sheets”. This expands the uni-
verse of potential applicants to those emerging-market
economies that have shown improving current ac-
count positions and stable primary fiscal surpluses
in the recent past that might have been excluded from
the CCL.
Qualification conditions
Qualification for an RAL, on the request of the
member, would be subject to submission and ap-
proval of a forward-looking policy framework
document, including measures leading to reduction
of vulnerabilities that might trigger a capital account
crisis in countries where these are still present. Thus,
while there is a precommitment of policy credibility
similar to CCL, the scope of the policies covered is
potentially much broader.
Liquidity provision
In difference from the CCL the RAL has a spe-
cific precommitment to exceptional access of 300 per
cent of quota, with full and automatic disbursement
on request. While it meets the credible signalling
requirement of exceptional access, the amount of
access is only in the mid-range of the suggested
access under the CCL. Further, according to a Fund
study on the role of exceptional access to Fund
resources in reducing the probability of crisis, low-
ering the probability of a crisis to 25 per cent for a
sample of capital crisis countries included in the
study would have required 345 per cent of quota.8 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 47
Lowering this to 10 per cent and five per cent re-
spectively would require 410 per cent and 460 per
cent of quota, respectively. While the study notes
that such amounts are not out of line with the finan-
cial resources subsequently provided in some capital
account crises, these figures indicate that the pre-
commitment to exceptional financing guaranteed
in the RAL is only a very modest signal.25 Given
this background, a figure in the range of 500 per
cent of quota, nearer that introduced in response to
the 1970s’ crisis would be more appropriate. Since
that time, the size of private financial flows has in-
creased dramatically, and even if they are not used
to provide non-conditional financing of balance of
payments’ disequilibria, their reversal in the event
of a global liquidity crisis, such as that experienced
in 1998, can be even more damaging. Further, in
difference from the 1970s, the nature of flows has
changed from syndicated bank lending to bond fi-
nancing and foreign direct investment flows,
reducing even more the potential catalytic impact of
Fund lending.26
In addition, the 50 billion SDR overall maxi-
mum placed on commitments under the Facility also
raises difficulty since the desirable increase in Fund
quotas would reduce the number of countries that
could be granted coverage.
The decision to offer only a uniform commit-
ment for all countries also reduces the credibility of
the Fund’s signal to the extent that Fund quotas do
not currently reflect a country’s potential exposure
to capital reversal, in difference from its exposure
to a decline in export earnings. Thus, in the absence
of a substantial quota increase the magnitude of fund-
ing provided by the Facility remains both insufficient
and possibly inappropriate to needs. This means the
success of the Facility in providing a credible signal
of the ability of a country to resist crisis will depend
on discussions concerning quota increases.
Finally, the kind of situation that the RAL is
meant to deal with is similar to that faced by a Cen-
tral Bank seeking to stop the systemic spread of lack
of confidence caused by the failure of a single bank.
Indeed, many have recommended that the IMF act
more like an international lender of last resort, and
it seems clear that the RAL is intended as a step in
that direction. However, the ability of a Central Bank
to exercise this function is due to its unlimited abil-
ity to create and commit liquidity resources to
institutions under threat of a loss in confidence by
its creditors. Limitations on support can thus only
reduce the effectiveness of the RAL in this regard.
Review process
The revised review process involves an assess-
ment immediately after the decision to draw on the
Line, and subsequent semi-annual reviews. Although
the RAL may be renewed indefinitely, once it is
drawn, it will carry a one-year repayment period and
thus have a single review.27 In the event that a coun-
try requires more sustained support, it is presumed
that this will be provided through an SRF or other
existing Stand-by arrangement. The broader defini-
tion of coverage for RAL qualification means that
its scope is now virtually identical to the SRF. As
such the Fund has decided to impose the same terms
and charges.
Fee structure
As already noted, one of the major drawbacks
of the CCL was the commitment fee and structure
of charges. In the 2000 review of Fund Facilities,
IMF staff had already noted that the similarity in the
terms and charges between the CCL and the SRF
gave countries little incentive to undergo the CCL
review and pay the commitment fee. In the event of
a crisis, they would get more or less the same sup-
port at the same charge structure without the potential
for negative signalling and the prepayment of the
commitment fees.28 While this led to a decision to
reduce fees for the CCL, that decision appears to
have been reversed in the RAL. Indeed, the draw-
back has been made stronger by the stronger linkages
to the SRF and the presumption that in cases where
there is not a rapid return to stability, an SRF ar-
rangement will be required.
Issues left unresolved
The commitment to full and automatic initial
disbursement without additional review is an impor-
tant improvement over the CCL and makes the signal
of the Fund’s commitment as a seal of approval more
credible. However, the proposal only notes that the
disbursement will take place “if need arises”, with-
out introducing an explicit mechanism for determining
need. It should be supposed that it would be granted
on the simple request of the country.
Presumably, the commitment to disbursement
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post-disbursement review in order to assess whether
the conditions for RAL support indeed existed, rather
than having been more appropriate to some other
Facility. But an announcement to this effect would
have negative consequences for the country and re-
quire the normal review for an alternative Facility,
thus reducing the strength of the commitment signal
and the immediacy of provision of support. It would
clearly be more expeditious to leave this assessment
for the end of the period, making the RAL funding
unconditional for the one-year period. The proposal
also calls for a semi-annual interim review that would
also limit the benefit gained from automatic imple-
mentation by raising the possibility of withdrawal
of support and should also be unnecessary.
The roles of liquidity and policy conditionality
In supporting its new approach to liquidity pro-
vision, the Fund has insisted that the success of its
precautionary programmes is due as much to their
policy conditionality as to the liquidity provided.29
While the RAL does not indicate specific policies to
maintain macroeconomic stability, the Fund expects
from countries qualifying for an RAL, an indication
can be found in the already cited IMF paper30 that
attempts to assess and distinguish empirically be-
tween the contributions of the amount of Fund
liquidity and the policy conditionality that accom-
panies Fund lending programs. It notes the finding
that “better policies, the signaling of these policies
and of the authorities commitment to them, and li-
quidity – through which a Fund supported program
may reduce the likelihood of a crisis, taken together,
... suggest that: stronger policies – tighter monetary
policy (higher real interest rates) or greater fiscal
adjustment (particularly in the context of a Fund
supported program) are significantly associated with
a lower crisis likelihood.”
However, if the appropriate response to a cri-
sis resulting from contagion is to maintain “tighter
monetary policy (higher real interest rates) or greater
fiscal adjustment (particularly in the context of a
Fund supported program)”, then the policy will re-
inforce the inherently pro-cyclical nature of most
external shocks. It is unlikely that such measures
introduced to reduce absorption are likely to con-
vince foreign lenders to continue to provide the
capital inflows that would allow the borrower to re-
pay the Fund and other official lenders, and to
provide sufficient additional inflows to allow exist-
ing creditors to exit if they so desired. In the past,
such policies have had the impact of causing a de-
cline in tax yields and a recession that simply
reinforces the loss of confidence of international in-
vestors.31
Further, since developing countries tend to have
more volatile export earnings than developed coun-
tries, even stable domestic policies will tend to be
procyclical. Most studies show that output volatility
leads to lower sustainable growth rates, so that these
policies would tend to run counter to the objective
of providing funding in order to allow a country to
continue to undergo sustained expansion.32
Debt sustainability
The RAL proposal also indicates that approval
will include a “rigorous and systemic analysis” that
shows “a high probability that the debt will remain
sustainable” and that the country must remain “com-
mitted to policies directed at reducing remaining
vulnerabilities, including as they relate to balance
sheets and the financial sector, giving confidence that
it will react appropriately in the event of crisis.”33
With respect to strategies to ensure debt sustainability,
the IMF and World Bank have recently produced a
new forward-looking approach to be applied to bor-
rowing permitted to IDA countries and those
emerging from the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
(HIPC) process. However, this approach does not
seem to be applicable to the market-access coun-
tries envisaged for the RAL. It is thus probable that
the RAL refers to the traditional Bank-Fund approach
to debt sustainability defined “as a situation in which
a borrower is expected to be able to continue servic-
ing its debts without an unrealistically large future
correction to the balance of income and expendi-
ture.”34 As noted in one of the first formal analyses
of debt sustainability: “The fulfillment of debt serv-
ice obligations is thus dependent on the economy’s
capacity to adjust the claims on total resources, sav-
ings, and foreign exchange in any given year and
over time so as to release the amount required for
debt service.”35 Debt sustainability thus depends on
the capacity, willingness and ability of governments
to sacrifice domestic objectives to meet foreign
claims. Note the contract with the commitment under
the original version of Article IV to adjust “without
resorting to measures destructive of national or in-
ternational prosperity”. Both deal with the ability of
policy to reduce the domestic use of resources to
meet foreign claims without a negative impact on ex-
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domestic political support. This would seem to
imply that in the event of contagion from external
shocks, countries approved for the RAL would be
required to show the political will to sacrifice do-
mestic objectives such as growth, full employment
and improved income distribution to meet debt serv-
ice. This would also add to the pro-cyclical nature
of the policies pursued to prevent capital reversal.
In addition, for most middle-income borrowers,
debt ratios are strongly influenced by the translation
effect of exchange rates on foreign currency debt
and by international interest rates, both of which are
largely independent of government policy measures.
Just as the reversal of United States policies in the
late 1970s produced the rapid rise in United States
interest rates and the dollar exchange rate, the cur-
rently low United States rates, the dollar weakness
and rising external United States trade deficits have
brought improvements to many middle-income
countries’ external and debt positions, largely inde-
pendent of domestic policies. Thus, stable domestic
policies may be pro-cyclical or counter-cyclical,
depending on international economic conditions.
Given that the RAL is meant to allow countries to
resist the impact of external shocks, one of the roles
should be to provide policy flexibility to offset their
negative consequences.
Given the short-term nature of most domestic
debt, domestic interest rates are another major de-
terminant, but policies to ensure central bank
independence may conflict with policies to increase
debt sustainability and to ensure fiscal surpluses. In
many countries, interest rates are sufficiently high
so that they increase the outstanding domestic cur-
rency government debt stocks by more than the
government primary surplus, thus leading to in-
creasing nominal debt and nominal surpluses. The
remaining mechanisms for improving debt sustain-
ability are changing the terms and composition of
existing debt through debt management policies or
restructuring, again only feasible over the medium
term.
Neither are there indications of the policy that
might be implemented toward “reducing remaining
vulnerabilities, including as they relate to balance
sheets and the financial sector, giving confidence that
the member will react appropriately in the event of
crisis.”36 These might refer to building domestic capi-
tal markets, with the associated institutional regulatory
and supervisory institutions. But these are long-term
policies and are unlikely to change markedly over
the one-year period of an RAL, nor are they likely
to be affected by an external crisis or to provide sig-
nals of the ability of a country to survive contagion.
Neither can they be implemented with rapid effect
to offset an internally generated crisis. The same will
generally be true of strengthening private sector bal-
ance sheets and reducing currency mismatches.
Conclusions
It is now widely accepted that the attempt to
use a Fund programme as a catalyst to encourage
private lenders to support adjustment in conditions
of capital account crisis has not been a success. The
shift from bank lending to capital market lending
and foreign direct investment as the major private
financial flows has further reduced the possibility
of success.
The appropriate conditionality
On the other hand, the recent experiments with
market-driven sovereign debt resolutions has pro-
duced evidence that a Fund programme may have a
positive influence on the negotiation of a sustain-
able debt restructuring package.37 There is also
evidence that the impact of Fund lending is also
improved when coupled with policies to dampen the
negative impact of the crisis on domestic demand.38
This suggests that Fund lending packages be coupled
with some form of institutional debt restructuring
mechanism, similar to the SDRM proposals made
in the aftermath of the Asian debt crisis, and that
more flexibility be allowed for counter-cyclical poli-
cies to support growth and employment.
Nonetheless, it is still the belief that the new
Fund policy could be effective in crisis prevention.
This has been the basis for the proposed CCL and
the more recent RAL. Here, a Fund commitment to
exceptional access is coupled with a positive existing
record of policy performance and debt sustainability
to limit contagion with the intention to reassure lend-
ers of the viability of the country’s programme and
the ability to meet any difficulties by an automatic
exceptional access drawing on the Fund. However,
given the strict qualifying conditions, any deterio-
ration in a country’s condition is likely to be the result
of factors beyond the control of its domestic poli-
cies. Thus, maintaining a commitment to policies in11 IMF Contingency Financing for Middle-income Countries with Access to Private Capital Markets
order to access funding may not be the optimal re-
sponse to an external disturbance. Rather, funding
might be better used to provide the country with the
ability to use policy to offset, rather than reinforce,
the domestic impact of the external shock. This
would make it easier to maintain stable policies over
the long term.
That this flexibility has not been included is
usually justified by fear of moral hazard – that coun-
tries receiving support will avoid undertaking the
necessary adjustments. However, if the shocks are
truly external, then there should, by definition, be
no need for additional adjustment, but rather for
counter-cyclical policies to offset the shock. Moral
hazard should not be a relevant consideration in these
circumstances.
Sufficient liquidity, insufficient income
Despite the clear evidence that success in the
new approach to liquidity provision requires much
higher levels of Fund resources, and in particular, a
revision of quotas, the IMF has recently argued that
its liquidity position is more than sufficient to meet
its needs. However, this position is primarily due to
the fact that the demand for Fund resources has de-
clined even more rapidly. Purchases from the General
Resources Account in 2005 and 2006 were only
slightly above 2 billion SDR and no activity has been
reported for 2007. Of the current value of member
quotas of over 215 billion SDR, the Fund reports
157 billion SDR of usable resources. The IMF cur-
rently has only 8 outstanding General Resources
Account (GRA) arrangements of 7.750 billion SDR,
with more than 6.8 billion SDR to Turkey alone.39
Since the Fund generates operating revenues from
the interest spread on its GRA arrangements, the re-
cent repayments, often anticipated, of outstanding
arrangements has led to a sharp compression in Fund
income. Paradoxically, despite the appearance of
sufficient liquidity, the fact that the Fund is currently
running a deficit may jeopardize its ability to meet
its mandated current activities such as the role of
augmented surveillance in generating efficient sig-
nalling to the private sector.
Ideally, the SDR could play a key role in creat-
ing a lender-of-last-resort facility, so that it would
become a true fiduciary asset and enhance its role
and share in global reserves. Indeed, after the out-
break of the Mexican crisis, in his statement to the
Copenhagen Social Summit in March 1995, the
Managing Director of the IMF suggested that an ef-
fective cure depended on “convincing our members
to maintain, at the IMF level, the appropriate level
of resources to be able to stem similar crises if they
were to occur”, adding that this would imply a deci-
sion, inter alia, for “further work on the role the SDR
could play in putting in place a last-resort financial
safety net for the world”. Such a step would require
an amendment of the Articles of Agreement and
could face opposition from some major industrial
countries. Since it is insisted that the IMF should
remain largely a quota-based institution, funding
through bond issues by that institution is also ruled
out. This leaves the Fund’s normal resources, to-
gether with its borrowing facilities, as the only
potential sources of funding. However, they alone
would not provide financing on the scale made avail-
able by the IMF and other sources during the recent
Mexican and East Asian crises.
The simultaneous appearance of excess liquid-
ity and declining income from use of Fund liquidity
is largely due to the decline in demand for Fund serv-
ices that has occurred since the late 1990s. Part of
this is due to the sharp recent decline in credit spreads
on emerging market debt which has brought the cost
of private sector borrowing down to levels that are
more than competitive with Fund resources, espe-
cially given the fact that they do not incorporate
repayment conditions. Another factor is the sharp
build-up of foreign exchange reserves in many
emerging market countries. What is a clear policy
decision on the part of these countries to provide
insurance against capital reversals, that was formerly
provided by accessing Fund liquidity, has been sup-
ported in some countries by extremely high levels
of direct investment inflows, and in others by sharp
improvements in the terms of trade for primary goods
leading to commercial and, in some cases, current
account surpluses. Given current patterns of interest
rates, in some countries, these large reserve balances
now have a positive carry and represent a source of
income. These factors have also allowed some coun-
tries with existing Fund arrangements to make early
repayment. It seems clear that most countries that
have built up excessive external reserves have done
so precisely because they believe that the policy
conditionality attached to IMF liquidity is not al-
ways in a country’s interest. This is also likely to be
true of the assessment of the conditionality attached
to the RAL. This means that the IMF is failing to pro-
vide one of its initial mandates, of reducing the costs
of its members’ holding of reserves through pooling.12 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 47
Dealing with symptoms or dealing with causes
In assessing the ability of any contingent fi-
nancing facility to succeed it is important to recall
that the new Fund approach was created by the usur-
pation of the Fund’s role as arbitrator of adjustment
financing by private international capital flows. It is
this that has created the possibility of excessively
large accumulated external imbalances, the risk of
capital reversals, and the more or less permanent
need to provide exceptional access for countries ex-
periencing reversals. In this context, it is important
to remember that capital surges can have the same
negative impact on a country’s performance and its
ability to meet its policy commitments as capital
reversals. The problems currently being faced by a
number of Asian and Latin American countries with
capital surges make it obvious that the risks are asym-
metric. Thus, a comprehensive Fund approach to the
problem of capital outflows should also include
measures to deal with capital inflows. The recent
experience in Thailand is a case in point. Thus, poli-
cies to manage private capital inflows should also
be part of the qualifications for contingent access to
Fund resources. Just as Central Banks exercise pru-
dential controls over the activities and balance sheets
of the institutions that have access to lender of last
resort facilities, the IMF should allow governments
to exercise similar prudential regulations to manage
the impact of external flows on domestic balance
sheets.
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